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The Diffusion Discussions

Rilicon · 2026-09-29T12:53:33+00:00

THE DIFFUSION DISCUSSIONS In An Attempt to Defuse Global Tensions, Rilicon Proposes a Meeting of World Leaders To Stabilize Global Politics As global tensions reach a new high, with the Tejan state of Thessara going through a conflict, Rilicon’s recent rise to power, unusual finds in and around Javnia, and InCom increasingly butting heads with world powers, the world is under high political stress, and one wrong move could spell a disaster like the one we’ve already gone through. This meeting of nations, big and small, hopes to de-escalate world politics and get rigid political positions and opinions out of the way long enough for a meaningful discussion. If no nation wishes to host this event, then the Democratic Republic of Rilicon will host it. The host nation would decide the time of the event, along with the exact venue of it. In this time of political unrest, world leaders should meet in a personal setting, away from outside influence. There, we can discuss world economics, scientific discoveries and advancements, and more importantly, world conflicts. So, Rilicon proposes a meeting of world leaders, and invites the delegates of @Inmoria @Thessara @Greica @The Holy Empire of Deidadios @Nordstjerne @Atsqia @Dagestan @New Valdoria @Dechikely @Kingdom of Bayn @Promothea @Javnia @Guangzhou @Zvlokiquix The Democratic Republic of Rilicon does not seek to host these discussions by default. Should another nation wish to host the event, Rilicon would gladly leave the responsibility to them. If no nation volunteers to host, Rilicon is prepared to provide a venue.

Javnia

We appear to have lost some data here. The question is after this hiccup, are we still interested? Block IV only had one response before the hiccup. With the exception of that post. I have everything else saved and can repost if necessary. So, do we continue?

Zvlokiquix

Javnia OOC: Can we please extend Block IV for another 24 hour block? I looked at the thread yesterday and swear I didn’t see anything.

Javnia

Sounds good. I’ll do the summary on Tuesday. So Block IV until Tuesday.

…and all the information is back. Yay!

Thessara

OOC: I have been busy with work and moving with my girlfriend to a new place, I will get back on this. Be patient with me please. 🙄

Zvlokiquix

POST-COLLAPSE SUPER NATION OF ZVLOKIQUIX

BLOCK IV — NEW ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Representative K.G. took the floor.

“Zvlokiquix supports the proposed classification framework. We agree that an organization’s ability to act, the authority it claims, and whether other nations recognize that authority are separate questions.”

“Zvlokiquix does not recognize corporate sovereignty. A corporation may possess enormous wealth, control strategic infrastructure, operate across several countries, or maintain armed security forces. That can make it an important international actor. It does not, by itself, make it a sovereign state.”

“For Zvlokiquix, recognition requires more than wealth and defense. We would expect a durable governing authority, a population, a meaningful territorial basis, a functioning legal and administrative system, continuity beyond individual owners or executives, and the ability to conduct foreign relations in its own right.”

“We are comfortable classifying corporations, quasi-states, armed groups, and unidentified organizations according to what they actually do. But classification should not itself grant legitimacy or recognition.”

“Likewise, speaking with an entity, trading with it, or signing a limited agreement with it should not automatically be treated as recognition of sovereignty.”

“Accountability should follow actual authority and conduct. If an organization controls armed personnel, territory, infrastructure, or civilians, then it should be answerable for what it does with that control.”

K.G. paused.

“Being important enough that the world must pay attention to you is not the same thing as being a country.”

—

COUNTRY POSITION PAPER

Country:
Post-Collapse Super Nation of Zvlokiquix

Topic:
New Actors in International Affairs — Block IV

Current Policy:
Zvlokiquix distinguishes between international influence and sovereign statehood. Corporations, armed organizations, quasi-state entities, and unidentified organizations may possess sufficient economic, military, territorial, or administrative capability to require international attention without thereby qualifying as sovereign nations. Zvlokiquix does not recognize corporate sovereignty solely on the basis of wealth, infrastructure, armed capability, or international influence.

Proposed International Action:
Zvlokiquix supports an International Actor Classification Framework based upon observable authority, capabilities, territorial or administrative control, organizational continuity, command structure, and conduct. Classification should assist governments in understanding and interacting with consequential organizations without automatically granting diplomatic recognition. Cross-border armed corporate activity should require host-state authorization, and responsibility for the conduct of an actor should follow the authority and control it actually exercises.

What the Government Will Not Accept:
Zvlokiquix will not accept corporate wealth, ownership of strategic infrastructure, or possession of armed forces as sufficient evidence of sovereignty. It will not accept international classification automatically granting or denying statehood, nor will it accept commercial or operational agreements being treated automatically as diplomatic recognition.

Information the Government Can Provide:
Zvlokiquix may provide appropriate diplomatic, security, commercial, or intelligence information relevant to determining the practical capabilities, command structure, territorial control, and international conduct of an actor, subject to national-security restrictions.

Question for Other Nations:
What additional qualities, beyond wealth, armed capability, and practical influence, must an organization possess before your government is willing to recognize it as a sovereign state?

Javnia

Summary of Each Nation.

Summary: Guangzhou’s Position on New Actors in International Affairs

Carmilla Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer of Vowbound Industries and Minister of Sovereign Defense of Guangzhou, presents Guangzhou’s position on the proposed International Actor Classification Framework during Day Four, Block IV of the international conference.

Guangzhou supports Javnia’s proposed framework but insists that it remain voluntary, nonbinding, and respectful of national sovereignty.

Key Points

- Corporate governance: Guangzhou’s twelve major corporations administer essential national functions, including defense, energy, healthcare, finance, and transportation. However, they derive their authority from Emperor Tronus and possess no independent sovereignty within Guangzhou. The Imperium can withdraw their authority and reclaim their responsibilities.

- Corporate sovereignty: Guangzhou formally abstains from supporting or opposing the sovereign claims of independent corporations operating abroad. It refuses to let commercial relationships imply diplomatic recognition or rejection.

- Corporate military forces: Corporations are not inherently hostile or unlawful simply because they maintain armed forces. Their operations should be assessed according to authorization, mission, conduct, and accountability. Deployments into foreign territory require the host government’s agreement.

- Accountability for military operations: Corporations should bear primary responsibility for their personnel, equipment, and resulting damages. Their parent states may share responsibility when evidence establishes governmental direction, material support, or a legally significant failure of oversight.

- Quasi-states and disputed entities: Commercial agreements do not automatically grant or deny sovereignty. Guangzhou advocates evidence-based assessments of unidentified organizations exercising territorial or administrative control, without prematurely labeling them criminal or hostile.

- International investigations: Guangzhou supports cross-border cooperation but rejects automatic foreign access to its territory, facilities, and classified information. Investigations within Guangzhou require authorization from the appropriate national authorities.

Guangzhou’s Proposed Framework

Guangzhou accepts Javnia’s six proposed classifications:

Recognized states
Quasi-state entities
Corporate geopolitical actors
Armed non-state actors
Unidentified actors
International organizations

It proposes nine guiding principles, emphasizing that classification must not determine sovereignty, corporate military activity must be assessed fairly, foreign deployments require host-state consent, responsibility must follow evidence, and international investigations must respect sovereign jurisdiction.

Guangzhou also proposes a Sovereignty Protection Clause stating that the framework cannot independently confer or deny sovereignty, diplomatic recognition, territorial jurisdiction, or governmental authority.

Overall Position

Guangzhou seeks international cooperation without creating a supranational authority capable of overriding national governments. It supports common terminology, consistent assessments, and accountability for corporate activities while preserving each nation’s right to determine its own diplomatic relationships.

The central message: International classification is not diplomatic recognition. Corporations may exercise significant power, but their political status and the legitimacy of their authority must be evaluated separately.

Summary: Zvlokiquix — Block IV: New Actors in International Affairs

Zvlokiquix supports Javnia’s proposed International Actor Classification Framework but rejects the idea that corporate wealth or military power alone can establish sovereignty.

Representative K.G. argues that an organization’s capabilities, its claimed authority, and its recognition by other nations are three separate matters.

Key Positions

No automatic corporate sovereignty: Wealth, strategic infrastructure, international operations, and armed security forces do not make a corporation a sovereign state.
Criteria for statehood: Recognition should consider durable governing authority, a population, a meaningful territorial basis, functioning legal and administrative institutions, organizational continuity, and the ability to conduct foreign relations independently.
Classification without recognition: Corporations, quasi-states, armed groups, and unidentified organizations may be classified according to their actual capabilities and activities without automatically receiving diplomatic legitimacy.
Agreements do not equal recognition: Trade, negotiations, and limited operational agreements should not automatically be interpreted as recognition of sovereignty.
Accountability follows control: Organizations should be responsible for their conduct when they exercise authority over armed personnel, territory, infrastructure, or civilians.
Foreign military deployments: Corporate armed forces operating across borders should require authorization from the host state.
Information sharing: Zvlokiquix is willing to provide relevant diplomatic, commercial, security, and intelligence information, subject to national-security restrictions.

What Zvlokiquix Opposes

The government will not accept:

Corporate wealth or military capability as sufficient proof of statehood.
International classifications that automatically grant or deny sovereignty.
Commercial or operational agreements being treated as automatic diplomatic recognition.

Central Question to Other Nations

Zvlokiquix asks delegates to identify what additional qualities an organization must possess, beyond wealth, armed capability, and practical influence, before their governments would recognize it as a sovereign state.

Bottom line: Zvlokiquix distinguishes between being an influential international actor and being a country. It supports a framework that evaluates organizations according to their actual authority and conduct while leaving sovereign recognition to individual governments.

Javnia

BLOCK IV — NEW ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Consensus Summary: Guangzhou and Zvlokiquix

Guangzhou and Zvlokiquix broadly agree that the international community needs a common framework for classifying organizations that exercise significant economic, military, territorial, or administrative power. Both support Javnia’s proposed International Actor Classification Framework as a means of improving international understanding and cooperation. They agree that an organization’s practical capabilities, the authority it exercises, and its recognition as a sovereign state are separate questions. Classification alone must not determine an entity’s sovereign status.

Areas of Agreement

1. Classification does not equal recognition.

Both nations support distinguishing between an organization’s actual activities and its diplomatic status. Corporate influence, commercial agreements, security cooperation, and international engagement should not automatically confer or deny sovereign recognition.

2. Corporate power does not automatically establish sovereignty.

Both recognize that corporations may administer critical infrastructure, operate internationally, and maintain armed security forces without necessarily possessing independent sovereign authority. Guangzhou’s own corporations derive their authority from the Imperium, while Zvlokiquix emphasizes that corporate wealth and military capabilities alone are insufficient to establish statehood.

3. Accountability must follow authority and conduct.

Both support holding organizations accountable for activities undertaken through the powers they exercise. Corporate armed forces should operate under clear authorization, defined responsibilities, and appropriate legal arrangements. Guangzhou further proposes that a parent state may share responsibility when its involvement or legally significant failure of oversight establishes grounds for liability.

4. Cross-border military operations require host-state consent.

Both support requiring corporations to obtain authorization from the receiving government before deploying armed personnel into foreign territory. Agreements should establish the scope of operations, jurisdiction, permitted activities, and applicable responsibilities.

5. International engagement does not automatically establish statehood.

Both agree that trade, negotiations, infrastructure agreements, and limited security arrangements do not independently establish diplomatic recognition. Governments should retain discretion over their own recognition decisions.

6. Classification should be evidence-based.

Both support assessing organizations according to their actual capabilities and conduct rather than relying on assumptions or political claims. Zvlokiquix specifically highlights governing authority, population, territorial basis, legal and administrative institutions, continuity, and independent foreign relations as relevant considerations when evaluating statehood.

Proposed Common Framework

The two nations’ positions support the following shared principles:

Establish common classifications for recognized states, quasi-state entities, corporate geopolitical actors, armed non-state actors, unidentified actors, and international organizations.
Separate practical authority and operational capabilities from sovereign recognition.
Evaluate disputed organizations using verifiable evidence of their structures, activities, and control.
Require host-state authorization for foreign corporate armed deployments.
Establish clear procedures for accountability, compensation, and determining responsibility for damages.
Preserve each nation’s authority to determine its own diplomatic recognition policies.
Protect national jurisdiction and classified information while permitting voluntary international cooperation.

Remaining Differences in Emphasis

Although their positions substantially overlap, the two nations emphasize different aspects of the issue.

Guangzhou focuses on protecting national sovereignty, preserving domestic jurisdiction, limiting supranational authority, and determining when a parent state may share liability for corporate operations.
Zvlokiquix focuses on defining the characteristics that distinguish an influential international actor from a sovereign state, particularly durable governance, territorial and administrative foundations, organizational continuity, and independent foreign relations.

These positions are compatible: Guangzhou emphasizes the right of states to make their own determinations, while Zvlokiquix emphasizes the substantive criteria that may inform those determinations.

Consensus Statement for the Conference

BLOCK IV — CONSENSUS PRINCIPLES ON NEW ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Guangzhou and Zvlokiquix recognize the growing influence of corporations, quasi-state entities, armed non-state organizations, unidentified actors, and international institutions in global affairs. Both support the development of an International Actor Classification Framework to improve shared understanding, facilitate cooperation, and establish consistent principles for evaluating these entities.

The participating nations agree that classification, practical authority, and sovereign recognition must remain distinct. An organization’s wealth, military capabilities, control of infrastructure, territorial administration, or participation in international agreements shall not, by themselves, determine its sovereign status.

Organizations should be assessed according to their actual authority, capabilities, command structures, continuity, territorial or administrative control, and conduct. Where sovereign statehood is being considered, relevant factors may include governing institutions, population, territorial foundations, legal and administrative systems, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations independently.

Corporate armed forces operating abroad should require authorization from the host state and function under clearly established legal and operational arrangements. Organizations should bear responsibility for their own conduct, while the responsibility of parent or sponsoring states should be determined according to applicable law and evidence of governmental involvement or legally significant failures of oversight.

Commercial, diplomatic, and operational agreements shall not automatically constitute recognition or rejection of sovereignty. Each participating nation retains the right to determine its own diplomatic relationships and recognition policies.

The framework should encourage evidence-based classification, voluntary information sharing, appropriate accountability, and international cooperation while respecting national sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, and legitimate security restrictions. Classification shall serve an informational and cooperative purpose and shall not independently confer or deny sovereign status.

These principles establish a common basis for further negotiations without requiring participating nations to adopt identical recognition policies or constitutional arrangements.

Overall consensus: Both nations support a practical, evidence-based classification system that recognizes the influence of nontraditional international actors without automatically granting them sovereignty, while ensuring accountability and preserving the authority of individual states.

Javnia

KINGDOM OF JAVNIA

Proposal for a Mutual International Actor Classification and Sovereignty Protection Framework

Submitted for consideration under Block IV — New Actors in International Affairs

I. Purpose

The Kingdom of Javnia proposes the establishment of a voluntary International Actor Classification Framework to improve international understanding, facilitate cooperation, and establish common principles for assessing organizations exercising significant political, economic, military, territorial, or administrative influence.

The international system increasingly includes actors whose capabilities and activities extend beyond traditional governmental structures. Corporations administer critical infrastructure, armed organizations exercise territorial control, and entities without universal recognition may perform governmental functions.

These developments require a common method of describing such actors without prejudging their legitimacy, determining disputed sovereignty, or compelling nations to adopt identical diplomatic policies.

The proposed framework shall provide a practical basis for classification, communication, and accountability while preserving the sovereign authority of participating nations.

II. Foundational Principles

The framework shall operate according to the following principles:

1. Classification Is Not Recognition

Assigning an entity to a classification shall not independently confer or deny sovereignty, statehood, diplomatic recognition, territorial jurisdiction, or political legitimacy.

2. National Sovereignty Is Preserved

Each participating nation retains the authority to determine its diplomatic relationships, recognition policies, domestic legal arrangements, and conditions for foreign organizations operating within its jurisdiction.

3. Evidence-Based Assessment

Classifications shall be based on verifiable information concerning an entity’s identity, capabilities, command structure, authority, activities, and conduct. Uncertainty shall be recorded rather than replaced by unsupported conclusions.

4. Authority and Conduct Determine Responsibility

Organizations shall be assessed according to the authority they actually exercise and the activities they undertake. Responsibility for misconduct shall be determined through applicable law, evidence, and the relevant operational relationships.

5. International Engagement Does Not Automatically Confer Recognition

Trade, negotiations, infrastructure agreements, and security cooperation shall not independently establish or deny sovereign status.

6. Cooperation Without Compulsory Enforcement

The framework shall facilitate voluntary information sharing and coordinated assessments without creating an international licensing authority, sovereign recognition tribunal, or supranational enforcement body.

III. International Actor Classifications

Participating nations shall use the following six working classifications.

Category 1 — Recognized State

An entity possessing a functioning government, a defined territorial basis, and established diplomatic relations with other states. The extent of its recognition may vary, and recognition shall not be treated as the sole measure of its practical capacity.

Category 2 — Quasi-State Entity

An entity exercising sustained governmental authority over a population or territory without universal recognition or an otherwise settled international status. Its actual administrative capacity shall be distinguished from the legitimacy of its territorial claims.

Category 3 — Corporate Geopolitical Actor

A private or publicly owned commercial organization whose economic resources, infrastructure, technology, or security capabilities enable it to influence the policies or security of multiple states.

Category 4 — Armed Non-State Actor

An organized group outside the regular armed forces of a recognized state that possesses and employs, or credibly threatens to employ, organized armed capabilities. Its conduct and applicable legal obligations shall be assessed independently of its political objectives.

Category 5 — Unidentified Actor

An entity whose identity, leadership, origin, command structure, or institutional affiliation cannot be reliably established. This classification describes an identification or intelligence problem and shall not, by itself, establish criminality, hostility, or hostile intent.

Category 6 — International Organization

An institution established by agreement between states or under another recognized international legal instrument to coordinate policy, administer shared responsibilities, or pursue common objectives. Its authority shall depend on its constituent arrangements and applicable law.

These classifications are working definitions rather than mutually exclusive categories or final legal determinations. An entity may exhibit characteristics of several categories simultaneously, and its classification may change as reliable evidence becomes available.

IV. Assessment and Classification Procedures

Javnia proposes that participating nations adopt a common assessment procedure consisting of four elements:

A. Identification

Record the entity’s known name, leadership, organizational structure, affiliations, and stated objectives where such information is available.

B. Capability and Authority Assessment

Evaluate relevant evidence concerning territorial control, administrative functions, population under its authority, infrastructure, financial resources, armed capabilities, command structure, and continuity of operations.

C. Legal and Diplomatic Status

Record known recognition relationships, relevant legal arrangements, host-state authorizations, and applicable jurisdictional limitations separately from the entity’s operational classification.

D. Confidence and Review

Identify the evidence supporting the assessment, distinguish confirmed information from unresolved claims, and permit reassessment when material new information becomes available.

No classification shall require a participating nation to accept another nation’s conclusions concerning disputed sovereignty.

V. Corporate Security and Cross-Border Operations

Corporate ownership of infrastructure, possession of advanced technology, or maintenance of armed security forces shall not automatically establish sovereign status or unlawful intent.

However, corporations deploying armed personnel into another nation’s territory shall obtain authorization from the host government and operate under clearly defined legal and operational arrangements.

Such arrangements should specify, as appropriate:

The purpose and permitted scope of deployment.
The number and general capabilities of deployed personnel.
Applicable jurisdiction and rules governing their conduct.
Command and reporting responsibilities.
Procedures for investigating incidents and resolving claims.
Responsibility for damages and appropriate compensation.

These requirements shall govern cross-border conduct without determining the corporation’s sovereign status.

VI. Accountability and Responsibility

The corporation or organization exercising operational control shall bear primary responsibility for its personnel, equipment, activities, and resulting damages, subject to applicable law.

Responsibility may also extend to a parent, sponsoring, or authorizing state where evidence and applicable law establish a relevant basis, including governmental direction, material support, or a legally significant failure of required oversight.

No state shall automatically be held responsible for every action of a commercial organization solely because that organization originated within its territory.

Equally, corporate status shall not be used to evade responsibility where the evidence establishes legally attributable governmental involvement or other applicable grounds for liability.

Participating nations should cooperate in establishing appropriate claims procedures, investigating alleged misconduct, and determining responsibility through applicable legal mechanisms.

VII. Sovereignty, Recognition, and Commercial Agreements

The framework shall distinguish operational engagement from diplomatic recognition.

A nation may conduct trade, negotiate infrastructure access, establish security arrangements, or cooperate with an entity without thereby endorsing every claim that entity makes concerning sovereignty or territorial authority.

Likewise, participation in the framework shall not compel a nation to recognize, reject, or adjudicate an entity’s political status.

All agreements involving foreign organizations shall remain subject to the applicable laws, authorization procedures, and jurisdiction of the participating nations concerned.

VIII. Unidentified Actors and Information Sharing

Where an organization exercises administrative, territorial, or armed control but its identity or command structure remains uncertain, participating nations may classify it provisionally as an Unidentified Actor.

Such classification shall describe the available state of knowledge rather than establish hostile intent or criminality.

Participating nations may voluntarily exchange relevant diplomatic, commercial, security, and intelligence information, subject to domestic law, confidentiality requirements, and national-security restrictions.

Joint assessments should distinguish verified facts, credible allegations, and unresolved questions. No participating nation shall be required to disclose classified information or grant foreign investigators access to its territory or facilities without appropriate national authorization.

IX. Implementation and Review

Javnia proposes a voluntary consultation mechanism through which participating nations may:

Exchange national classification methodologies and relevant non-classified information.
Develop common assessment templates and terminology.
Request consultations concerning actors operating across multiple jurisdictions.
Review classifications when new evidence materially changes the available assessment.
Develop mutually agreed procedures for corporate security deployments and cross-border accountability.
Record differences in national recognition policies without requiring uniformity.

The mechanism shall not independently determine sovereignty, compel diplomatic recognition, authorize foreign deployments, conduct compulsory investigations, or override domestic law.

Each nation shall retain discretion over whether to participate in particular consultations and whether to adopt recommendations arising from them.

X. Proposed Sovereignty Protection Clause

“Nothing within this Framework shall independently confer or deny sovereignty, statehood, diplomatic recognition, territorial jurisdiction, or governmental authority upon any entity.

No classification shall compel a participating nation to recognize, reject, or otherwise adjudicate the political status of an entity.

The Framework shall not supersede the constitutional authority, domestic laws, national-security requirements, or sovereign discretion of participating nations.

Its classifications shall serve informational, consultative, and cooperative purposes. Any legal consequences arising from an entity’s activities shall be determined under applicable law and the competent jurisdiction.”

XI. Request for Delegates’ Consideration

The Kingdom of Javnia invites participating nations to consider this proposal as a common foundation for international cooperation concerning new actors in international affairs.

Javnia welcomes amendments addressing classification criteria, evidence standards, corporate security arrangements, responsibility for cross-border misconduct, and protections for national sovereignty.

The objective is not to impose a single political model or resolve every dispute concerning recognition. It is to establish a shared vocabulary and practical procedures that allow nations to identify consequential actors, assess their conduct, cooperate where appropriate, and preserve their independent sovereign decisions.

The Kingdom of Javnia submits this framework for discussion, amendment, and voluntary adoption by the participating nations.

My main recommendation

Make Section X, the Sovereignty Protection Clause, the central negotiating point. It gives nations concerned about corporate sovereignty and external interference a concrete guarantee, while allowing other delegates to support common definitions, information sharing, and accountability without surrendering their own recognition policies.

The other important compromise is to keep classification and enforcement separate. The framework can identify an organization as an armed non-state actor or corporate geopolitical actor without automatically authorizing sanctions, military intervention, or legal judgments.

That combination gives delegates something tangible to adopt while leaving the most politically contentious sovereignty disputes unresolved.

OOC: when the conference is complete the recommended policies need to be finished and formalized. I think we should also consider making them guidelines for our RP. So a new nation would have to submit the information as a thread. Then it can be classified. I think this will give an opportunity for storytelling.

Javnia

KINGDOM OF JAVNIA

DAY FIVE — BLOCK V: CYBER & INFORMATION WARFARE

Opening Address and Proposal for International Cooperation

Presented by the Kingdom of Javnia

Distinguished heads of state, honorable delegates, and representatives of the international community,

Welcome to Day Five of our conference. Today, the Kingdom of Javnia invites the assembly to address a growing challenge to international security: cyber and information warfare in an increasingly interconnected world.

Modern conflict is no longer confined to physical territory, conventional weapons, or identifiable military formations. Hostile activity may originate through compromised computer networks, manipulated information, unidentified radio transmissions, or communications whose source, purpose, and command structure remain unknown.

A cyberattack against critical infrastructure may disrupt essential services without crossing a physical border. A coordinated information campaign may undermine public confidence, aggravate political instability, or interfere with another nation’s ability to respond to a crisis. An unidentified broadcast may carry legitimate communications, deliberate deception, or a warning of a threat that has yet to be understood.

In many cases, the immediate challenge is not simply determining what has occurred, but establishing who or what is responsible.

The Kingdom of Javnia believes that the international community must develop practical mechanisms for sharing technical information, documenting incidents, and coordinating assessments without requiring nations to surrender sensitive intelligence, disclose classified military capabilities, or compromise legitimate national-security interests.

Our objective today is not to establish a system that assigns blame before the evidence is available. Nor is it to create an international authority that dictates how participating states must conduct their cyber operations or manage their communications infrastructure.

Instead, we seek to establish a common foundation for cooperation: one that enables nations to recognize related incidents, compare technical findings, identify potential patterns, and improve their understanding of emerging threats.

I. The Principal Issues Before the Assembly

Javnia proposes that delegates focus on five interconnected areas.

First — Cyberattacks. How should nations report and assess cyber incidents that affect government systems, civilian infrastructure, communications networks, or essential services across national borders?

Second — Information Warfare. How can participating states exchange information concerning suspected disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulation, and other hostile information activities while preserving their respective legal systems and national responsibilities?

Third — Unidentified Radio Broadcasts. What procedures should governments use to document unusual transmissions, compare signal characteristics, and investigate broadcasts whose origin or purpose cannot immediately be established?

Fourth — Unknown Communications. How can nations cooperate when communications appear to originate from unknown transmitters, unrecognized networks, or entities whose identities and affiliations remain uncertain?

Fifth — Cyber Activity Associated with Unidentified Actors. How should the international community share technical findings when cyber incidents appear connected to organizations whose leadership, origin, command structure, or intentions have not been reliably established?

These issues share a common difficulty: technical evidence may be available before the identity or intent of the responsible actor is known.

Javnia therefore proposes that the assembly distinguish observed facts from technical assessments, suspected attribution, and confirmed responsibility. An unidentified source should not automatically be classified as hostile, and a technical association should not, by itself, constitute proof of state involvement.

II. Proposed International Communications Incident Registry

To address these challenges, the Kingdom of Javnia submits for consideration an International Communications Incident Registry (ICIR).

The proposed registry would provide participating states with a mechanism to share relevant technical information concerning unusual, unidentified, or potentially hostile communications incidents.

States could submit the following information where available and appropriate:

Time of transmission.
Frequency.
Geographic origin or estimated area of origin.
Signal characteristics.
Suspected transmitter.
Technical analysis.
Observed effects.
Associated cyber activity.

The registry would enable participating nations to compare observations, identify potentially related incidents, and develop a more complete technical understanding of communications activity occurring across multiple jurisdictions.

Importantly, participation would not require states to disclose classified intelligence, sensitive collection methods, cryptographic materials, or details of military capabilities. Submissions could be limited to information authorized for international sharing, with uncertainty and confidence levels clearly identified.

The ICIR would serve as a mechanism for documentation and technical cooperation, not as an independent intelligence service, attribution tribunal, or authority empowered to determine the intentions of an unidentified actor.

III. Proposed International Cyber Incident Reporting Framework

Subject to the assembly’s support, Javnia further proposes consideration of an International Cyber Incident Reporting Framework.

This framework would establish common principles for voluntarily reporting cyber incidents, exchanging relevant technical findings, and coordinating assessments of activity that may affect multiple participating states.

Its purpose would be to improve communication and situational awareness while preserving national control over sensitive information and domestic investigations.

Delegates are invited to consider what information should be shared, how reports should distinguish confirmed findings from suspected attribution, and what safeguards would be necessary to protect classified capabilities and confidential information.

The assembly should also consider how the proposed cyber reporting framework might complement the International Communications Incident Registry without unnecessarily duplicating reporting procedures.

IV. Principles for International Cooperation

Javnia proposes that both initiatives be guided by the following principles:

Voluntary participation: States retain control over whether and what information they submit.
Protection of classified information: No state is required to disclose sensitive military capabilities, intelligence sources, or protected operational details.
Technical transparency: Shared reports should identify the evidence supporting their findings and distinguish observation from inference.
Responsible attribution: No state or organization should be declared responsible solely on the basis of an unverified technical association.
Respect for sovereignty: International cooperation must not automatically grant foreign authorities access to another state’s networks, facilities, or classified information.
Practical cooperation: Participating states should be able to compare incident reports, identify possible connections, and request further consultation where appropriate.
Proportionate response: The documentation of an incident should remain separate from decisions concerning sanctions, diplomatic measures, or other national responses.

These principles are intended to make cooperation possible even among nations that maintain different security policies, intelligence capabilities, and diplomatic relationships.

V. Questions for Delegates

The Kingdom of Javnia invites the assembly to consider the following questions:

What minimum technical information should a state provide when reporting an unidentified communications incident?
How should the registry distinguish a confirmed transmitter location from an estimated geographic origin?
What safeguards would prevent unverified allegations from being treated as established attribution?
How can participating states share useful cyber incident information without exposing classified capabilities?
Should the registry include procedures for identifying potentially related incidents reported by multiple nations?
What relationship should exist between the International Communications Incident Registry and the proposed International Cyber Incident Reporting Framework?
How can international cooperation improve incident assessment without creating an authority that overrides national jurisdiction?

VI. Closing Remarks

Distinguished delegates,

In cyber and information warfare, uncertainty can be as consequential as the incident itself. A disrupted network, an unexplained transmission, or a coordinated series of communications may present a genuine threat, a technical failure, deliberate deception, or an activity whose significance cannot yet be determined.

Our response must be guided by evidence rather than assumption.

The Kingdom of Javnia believes that no nation should be expected to confront complex international communications incidents in isolation when voluntary technical cooperation could improve understanding and reduce uncertainty.

At the same time, cooperation must respect the legitimate security requirements and sovereign authority of every participating state.

The International Communications Incident Registry offers a practical starting point. A complementary International Cyber Incident Reporting Framework could extend that cooperation to cyber incidents affecting multiple jurisdictions.

Javnia does not propose that these mechanisms resolve every question of attribution or eliminate the possibility of conflict. We propose that they give participating nations a better means of establishing what happened, comparing what they know, identifying what remains uncertain, and deciding independently how to respond.

Our objective is straightforward: improve shared awareness without compromising national sovereignty, encourage cooperation without compelling disclosure, and establish the facts before assigning responsibility.

The Kingdom of Javnia submits these proposals for discussion, amendment, and consideration by the assembly.

Thank you.

Javnia

KINGDOM OF JAVNIA

DAY FIVE — BLOCK V: CYBER & INFORMATION WARFARE

FACTUAL BRIEFING: CURRENTLY KNOWN INCIDENTS

Prepared for: International Conference on Cyber & Information Warfare
Subject: Cyberattacks, unidentified radio broadcasts, and unknown communications
Status: Preliminary briefing based on currently reported information

I. Executive Summary

The information currently available identifies two principal areas of concern for the international community: a series of cyberattacks targeting strategic facilities in Guangzhou and Javnia, and multiple unexplained communications incidents reported by nations across the international community.

Four recent cyberattacks have targeted refineries and military installations in Guangzhou and Javnia. The available information does not establish who conducted the attacks, whether the incidents were coordinated, or what damage resulted.

Separately, multiple nations have received strange coded radio messages whose sources, meanings, and purposes remain unidentified. Several nations have also received unidentified messages that appear to originate from deep space. Their origins, transmission mechanisms, and significance have not been established.

These incidents warrant further technical investigation and international information sharing. At this stage, however, the available information does not establish a common source or connection between the cyberattacks and the unexplained communications.

II. Cyberattacks Against Strategic Facilities

Reported incidents: Four recent cyberattacks targeting Guangzhou and Javnia.

Known targets:

Refineries.
Military installations.

Currently established information:

Four attacks have been reported against strategic facilities associated with the two nations. The affected sectors include petroleum refining and military infrastructure.

Unresolved questions:

Which specific facilities were targeted?
When did each attack occur?
What systems were affected, and what damage or disruption resulted?
Were the attacks conducted by the same actor?
Did the incidents involve unauthorized access, malicious software, data theft, operational disruption, or another method?
Is there evidence connecting any attack to an unidentified organization, radio broadcast, or unknown communication?

Assessment: The targeting of energy and military facilities raises potential national-security concerns. However, the available information is insufficient to establish the attackers’ identities, motives, capabilities, or relationships with any government or organization.

III. Unidentified Radio Broadcasts and Coded Messages

Reported incidents: Multiple examples of unexplained communications have been detected by several nations.

Known characteristics:

Messages contain strange or coded material.
Multiple nations have received such messages.
The sources have not been identified.
The meaning and purpose of the messages remain unknown.

Unresolved questions:

Are the messages originating from one transmitter or several?
Do the transmissions share frequencies, signal characteristics, timing, or other technical features?
Are the messages genuinely encrypted, encoded, corrupted, or simply not understood?
Can their geographic origins be established?
Are the broadcasts intentional communications, automated transmissions, interference, or another phenomenon?
Is there any verified connection to the reported cyberattacks?

Assessment: The multinational distribution of these messages makes information sharing potentially valuable. Nevertheless, their unexplained nature does not establish hostile intent, coordinated activity, or a connection to any particular actor.

IV. Unidentified Messages Appearing to Originate From Deep Space

Reported incidents: Several nations have received unidentified messages that appear to originate from deep space.

Currently established information:

The messages have been reported by several nations and are described as apparently originating beyond Earth. Their origin and meaning remain unconfirmed.

Unresolved questions:

What instruments or communications systems detected the messages?
What observations support the estimated direction or distance of origin?
Have independent facilities detected the same signals?
Do the messages contain repeating patterns or other identifiable characteristics?
Can the signals be distinguished from terrestrial interference, equipment artifacts, or other known sources?
Is there evidence that the messages are intentional communications?
Are these detections related to one another or to the unidentified radio broadcasts?

Assessment: The apparent deep-space origin is an unresolved interpretation, not a confirmed finding. Independent technical analysis and comparison of observations would be necessary before determining the source, nature, or significance of these messages.

Thessara

UNITED STATES OF THESSARA — BLOCK IV POSITION

Good-day everyone.

The Sterling Administration supports the Kingdom of @[deleted] effort to establish a common framework through which governments may assess organizations that exercise significant political, military, administrative, or economic power beyond the traditional structure of recognized states, but Thessara considers it essential that this discussion begin from a distinction which, if blurred at the outset, would compromise the legal clarity of everything that follows: corporations, regardless of their wealth, reach, military capability, control of infrastructure, contractual relationships, territorial presence, or administrative influence, are not states, and commercial power, however extensive, does not mature into sovereignty merely because it becomes consequential.

A corporation may operate across numerous jurisdictions, control infrastructure upon which entire economies depend, maintain armed security forces, administer facilities of strategic importance, or perform functions that resemble those more commonly associated with governments, yet none of those circumstances confers independent diplomatic personality, sovereign jurisdiction, territorial title, general treaty-making capacity, or the legal status of a country.

Thessara can therefore accept the proposed category of corporate geopolitical actor only as a descriptive device intended to identify corporations whose conduct has international consequences, not as a legal category through which commercial organizations may gradually acquire the attributes of statehood. The same principle applies where a recognized government chooses, under its own constitutional arrangements, to delegate public functions to corporate bodies, because the delegation of authority may alter the manner in which state power is administered domestically without creating a separate sovereign entity alongside the state from which that authority ultimately derives.

The Sterling Administration accordingly accepts the explanation provided by the @[deleted] delegation concerning the Corporate Alliance as an account of Guangzhou’s internal constitutional structure, while maintaining that corporations exercising public functions under that system remain, for purposes of international legal analysis, subordinate to the sovereign authority from which those functions originate rather than independent countries in their own right.

The proposed classifications should therefore remain instruments of description and assessment rather than mechanisms by which political status is created. Recognized states, quasi-state entities, corporate geopolitical actors, armed non-state actors, unidentified actors, and international organizations may each possess distinct forms of authority or capability, but the act of placing an organization within one of those categories should neither grant nor deny sovereignty, recognition, governmental legitimacy, territorial jurisdiction, or diplomatic standing.

Thessara would regard the category of unidentified actor as especially provisional, because it describes an evidentiary deficiency rather than a settled legal condition: where the identity, command structure, leadership, institutional affiliation, or origin of an organization cannot yet be established, governments should record what can actually be demonstrated without converting uncertainty itself into a conclusion. In the island scenario raised by the chair, the existence of administrative offices, taxation, territorial control, binding orders, and armed personnel would establish that some organization exercises de facto authority, but those facts, standing alone, would not establish lawful sovereignty, and the Sterling Administration would therefore initially describe such an entity as an unidentified actor exercising de facto administrative control while further inquiry determined its leadership, command structure, source of financing, external relationships, control over armed personnel, treatment of the civilian population, the circumstances under which territorial control was obtained, and the durability of its institutions.

Thessara would oppose any presumption that de facto control by itself proves statehood, legitimacy, criminality, or insurgency, and would similarly insist that serious legal or diplomatic classifications rest upon corroborated evidence, verifiable chains of command, observable conduct, documentary material, reliable intelligence capable of confirmation, institutional control, and consistent patterns of activity rather than political assertion or convenience.

On recognition, Thessara maintains an equally firm separation between practical control and lawful sovereignty. The fact that an entity controls territory, administers a population, maintains institutions, or demonstrates the practical capacity to carry out commitments may be relevant to a government deciding whether recognition is appropriate, but such factors do not compel recognition, and they do not entitle corporations or other non-state organizations to convert themselves into states through the accumulation of power, contracts, or administrative functions.

Recognition remains a sovereign diplomatic act, and the Sterling Administration will not treat practical necessity as a substitute for that decision. There will nevertheless be circumstances in which recognized governments must communicate with, negotiate with, or conclude narrowly defined arrangements involving entities that they do not recognize as states, particularly where ceasefires, humanitarian access, prisoner exchanges, transit arrangements, emergency coordination, local security questions, or commercial performance cannot realistically be addressed without dealing with the organization exercising control over the relevant people, facilities, territory, or resources.

Thessara accepts the necessity of such arrangements while insisting that their legal effect remain confined to the specific subject matter agreed, because a ceasefire cannot become an instrument of diplomatic recognition, a commercial contract cannot become a vehicle for the acquisition of sovereign personality, and a humanitarian arrangement cannot confer general treaty-making competence upon an organization that Thessara does not recognize as a government.

The Sterling Administration therefore rejects any doctrine under which repeated commercial, administrative, or security dealings gradually manufacture statehood by accumulation, and would distinguish without ambiguity between the capacity of an unrecognized entity to perform a limited practical obligation and the general legal capacity of a sovereign state, which Thessara will acknowledge only where recognition has been expressly granted.

The corporate-security scenario should be approached through the same distinction between function and status. The possession of military-grade equipment, organized armed personnel, sophisticated command systems, or substantial security capabilities does not transform a corporation into a state or sovereign military authority, because equipment and capability determine what an organization can do rather than what it legally is.

A corporation may employ armed personnel for the protection of facilities, personnel, cargo, or infrastructure where the host government permits such activity under its domestic law, and such personnel remain corporate security forces for as long as their conduct remains within the lawful scope of that authorization. The analysis necessarily changes where armed corporate personnel begin conducting sustained offensive operations, exercising coercive authority over civilian populations, controlling territory independently of the recognized government, operating beyond the authorization of the host state, or undertaking functions that in substance amount to warfare, but even then the consequence is not that the corporation becomes a country; depending upon the circumstances, it may instead fall within the classification of an armed non-state actor or another regulated or unlawful organization.

Thessara agrees with the Guangzhou delegation that corporations possess no independent right to deploy armed personnel into the territory of a recognized state and that any such deployment must rest upon host-state authorization which, wherever reasonably possible, should define the mission, scale, command structure, jurisdiction, permitted activities, applicable law, operational limits, and procedures governing claims for misconduct or damage. A corporation may own facilities within another country, may have contractual rights within that country, and may maintain security personnel authorized by that country, but none of those interests confer territorial jurisdiction or sovereign authority over the land upon which those facilities stand.

Responsibility should likewise be determined through attribution, control, delegation, and legally relevant involvement rather than through labels or nationality alone. A corporation is responsible for conduct attributable to its own personnel and institutions, while a recognized government should not automatically become internationally responsible for every act committed by every company incorporated within its territory simply because the corporation shares its nationality.

At the same time, a government cannot avoid responsibility merely by placing the exercise of public or military power behind a corporate structure, and governmental responsibility may therefore arise where a state directs an operation, exercises effective control over it, formally delegates governmental authority, materially participates in the conduct, knowingly authorizes the relevant action, or fails to perform a specific international obligation to supervise or prevent it.

The existence of a corporate intermediary should neither create automatic attribution nor serve as a mechanism for dissolving attribution that would otherwise exist, which is why the international assessment of arrangements such as the Guangzhou Corporate Alliance should focus upon the legal source of the authority being exercised and the degree of state control or delegation involved rather than upon the mere fact of incorporation. Corporate nationality is insufficient to establish state responsibility, but corporate form is equally insufficient to extinguish it.

The broader questions of accountability and jurisdiction should follow the same legal architecture. An armed non-state organization may incur responsibility for unlawful armed conduct, a corporation may incur responsibility for violations committed through its operations, an unidentified organization exercising de facto control may incur responsibility for conduct attributable to the structures it commands, and a quasi-state entity may be held accountable for actions undertaken through institutions under its control, but none of those conclusions requires Thessara to recognize the actor as a sovereign government, because accountability and recognition answer different questions. An organization does not need to be a state in order to bear responsibility for harm, while the rights, privileges, immunities, jurisdictional claims, and general diplomatic capacities of statehood will not be extended by Thessara to corporations or other non-state actors merely because they are powerful, useful, dangerous, or administratively sophisticated. Similarly, no corporation, armed organization, quasi-state entity, foreign investigator, or international institution possesses an inherent right to enter Thessaran territory, inspect Thessaran facilities, obtain classified information, or exercise governmental authority within Thessara, since such authority must derive either from Thessaran law or from an international agreement lawfully accepted by the Thessaran government. Where Thessara has voluntarily granted defined authority through treaty, that authority will be respected according to its terms, because sovereign consent once lawfully expressed remains meaningful, but no non-state actor may independently claim jurisdiction over Thessara merely because it exercises substantial power elsewhere.

For these reasons, the Sterling Administration is prepared to support the International Actor Classification Framework itself as a nonbinding and informational instrument intended to establish common terminology, evidentiary standards, and methods of assessment, but it should not become a recognition tribunal, political licensing authority, or supranational institution empowered to determine which organizations are states. Recognized governments may, if they choose, subsequently conclude separate binding agreements governing specific matters such as cross-border armed deployments, claims procedures, compensation, investigative cooperation, notification requirements, or other forms of conduct requiring predictable international rules, and

Thessara will treat such obligations as binding where they have been voluntarily accepted through proper legal process.

The participation of corporations or other non-state actors in the implementation of such agreements, however, must not be interpreted as elevating those organizations to the legal position of countries, because the purpose of this framework should be to describe powerful non-state actors precisely enough that governments can regulate, investigate, negotiate with, and hold them accountable without being forced into the false choice of either treating them as states or pretending that they do not matter.

Thessara therefore supports a framework which recognizes practical power without confusing it with sovereignty, imposes responsibility without manufacturing legitimacy, permits necessary dealings with non-state actors without allowing those dealings to mature into recognition, and preserves the principle that companies, regardless of their influence or capabilities, remain companies rather than countries.

Javnia

CONCLUSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Final Statement of the Chair

Hello, everyone.

I would like to thank all participants for their time, contributions, and engagement throughout this conference. The discussions held across Blocks I through V have provided an opportunity to explore important questions of international cooperation, sovereignty, commerce, environmental accountability, scientific collaboration, and minimum safety standards.

Unfortunately, we are now 24 hours past the deadline for Block V, and no relevant submissions have been made. Accordingly, the conference is hereby declared closed.

Four proposed international agreements emerged from our discussions. While these policies received sufficient agreement in principle to advance, no participant has yet volunteered to take responsibility for drafting the final versions.

For reference, I have provided preliminary drafts at the conclusion of each respective block. These drafts are intended to serve as a starting point for further work, not as finalized legal instruments.

The four agreements are:

Mutual International Actor Classification and Sovereignty Protection Framework
International Commerce Principles Agreement
International Convention on Environmental Accountability, Scientific Cooperation, and the Shared Use of Outer Space
International Minimum Safety Standards Agreement

The next step is straightforward: participants must step forward to author, refine, and finalize these agreements. Once completed, the texts can be circulated among the participating nations and organizations for review, amendment, and formal endorsement.

The conclusion of this conference does not mean that the work undertaken here must end. On the contrary, the proposals developed during these discussions will only have lasting value if participants are willing to carry them forward and turn agreed principles into practical, workable international instruments.

I encourage all participants to consider taking ownership of one of these agreements and helping bring it to completion. Cooperation requires more than discussion; it requires initiative, responsibility, and a willingness to see commitments through.

Thank you again to everyone who participated. The conference is now formally concluded.

The Chair

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